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INTRODUCTION

Since the founding of the republic, few powers have been as exclusively reserved to the federal government as the power to conduct
foreign affairs. Despite persistent attempts by states to infringe upon
this prerogative, courts have repeatedly held that state law must yield
if it impairs either Congress's or the executive branch's conduct of
foreign policy.
Foreign affairs preemption has become especially important in
recent years as globalization has expanded the scope of what constitutes "foreign affairs."1 In the recent decision American InsuranceAssociation v. Garamendi, the Supreme Court held that a California
insurance statute mandating disclosure of outstanding Holocaust-era
insurance claims was preempted by an executive agreement.2 The
Court reasoned that the state statute conflicted with an executive order designed to harmonize the resolution of such claims through international cooperation. 3 Although the conflict between California's
statute and the executive order in Garamendi may have been evident,
the subsequent future application of the Court's rationale may limit
state power to legislate with respect to an ever-increasing number of
I

A Survey of Globalisation and Tax, EcONOMIST,Jan. 29, 2000, at 5 (defining globaliza-

Lion as "a diminishing role for national borders and the gradual fusing of separate national
markets into a single global marketplace"); see Sandra L. Lynch, The United States, the States,
and Foreign Relations, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 217, 219 (2000). Thus, with the diminution of
national borders and increased economic interdependence, issues that states previously
might have legislated and considered to be within the domestic sphere are now becoming
matters of international importance to be handled exclusively by the federal government.
A Survey of Globalisation and Tax, supra.
2 539 U.S. 396, 420-25 (2003).
3

Id. at 413-29.
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topics. The Court's reasoning suggests that even vaguely defined fed4
eral action may be sufficient to preempt state legislation.
This Note seeks to accomplish two goals. First, it attempts to discern a current, clear standard for foreign affairs preemption in light
of Garamendi. Second, this Note analyzes the possible policy implications of the Court's preemption doctrine and seeks to determine the
extent to which current federal preemption doctrine affects the ability
of states to legislate in areas of traditional state power. Part I outlines
the legal history of foreign affairs preemption and delineates the state
of preemption doctrine prior to Garamendi. Part II explores the reasoning of the Garamendi Court and the way in which this case reflects
current conceptions of foreign affairs preemption. Part III argues
that the Garamendi Court enunciated a preemption standard that is
more statutory than dormant, though the Court appeared hesitant to
retire the dormant concept altogether. Finally, Part IV argues that
Garamendi represents a positive development in the law of foreign relations because expansive foreign affairs preemption serves the U.S.
national interest, and alternative means of limiting potentially boundless judicial discretion exist.
I
THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

A.

Constitutional Foundations

Although courts and commentators dispute the scope of foreign
affairs preemption, it is difficult to deny (at least on a broad level) that
5
the conduct of the nation's foreign policy is a federal prerogative.
Even a cursory reading of the Constitution reveals that the Framers
intended to assign primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign
affairs to the federal government.6 Specifically, Article I, § 8 enumerates the express congressional foreign affairs powers, 7 while Article II,
4
5

See id. at 425.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 1 cmt. 5 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("A State of the United States is not a "state"
under international law .... since by its constitutional status it does not have capacity to
conduct foreign relations."); LoUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 25 (2d ed. 1996) ("In foreign affairs... the federal government has undisputed

monopoly, and it has plenary powers rooted in its 'sovereignty' beyond those expressed in
the Constitution.").
6 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 264 (James Madison) (Arlington House 1966)
("The... class of powers lodged in the general government consist of those which regulate
the intercourse with foreign nations ....
If we are to be one nation in any respect, it
clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.").
7
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. The Constitution grants to Congress the power to regulate
commerce with foreign Nations (the "foreign commerce clause"), to establish uniform
rules of naturalization, to regulate the value of "foreign coin," "[t]o define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Na-
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§ 2 details the executive's authority to act on the global stage. 8 Further supporting the federal government's exclusive authority over foreign affairs, Article I, § 10 specifically restricts the ability of the states,
among other things, to enter into treaties or agreements with foreign
powers. 9 There is little dispute regarding the exclusive federal authority to act within the scope of these enumerated (and "assumed-by-sovereignty") powers.1 0 Furthermore, independent of these enumerated
powers, the Supremacy Clause grants the federal government the
right to trump any state law inconsistent with a federal enactment."I
More controversial, however, is the constitutional support for the
theory of "dormant foreign affairs preemption," a theory that permits
courts to invalidate state actions infringing upon the foreign affairs
sphere in the absence of any on-point, conflicting federal action.
B.

Theoretical Overview

The idea of state exclusion from the conduct of foreign affairs is
therefore not novel. The Constitution expressly places specific aspects of foreign affairs within the federal realm. 12 For example, wag13
ing war and negotiating treaties are strictly federal prerogatives.
Even outside these enumerated provisions, most foreign affairs questions fall within the scope of the Supremacy Clause because treaties
tions; [t]o declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning

Captures on Land and Water." Id.
8
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The Constitution grants to the executive branch-the President-the title of Commander in Chief of the armed forces, as well as the power, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to enter into treaties and to appoint ambassadors. See id.
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. The Constitution prohibits the states from entering into a
treaty, alliance, or confederation, as well as from taxing imports and exports, keeping
troops or ships of war in time of peace, entering into an agreement with another state or
foreign power, or engaging in war not based in self-defense without Congressional consent. See id.
10 See REsTATEMENT,supra note 5, § I cmt. 1 ("Congress... has an unexpressed power
to legislate in foreign affairs, a legislative component of powers of the United States that
inhere in its sovereignty and nationhood."); HENKIN, supranote 5, at 25 (noting the federal
government's "undisputed monopoly" in the area of foreign relations).
11
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2 (
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
);Jack Goldsmith, Statutory FcreignAffairs Preemption, 2000 Sup. CT, REv. 175, 189 [hereinafter Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption].
12 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2; see also Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption,
supra note 11, at 194 ("Preemption would follow as a constitutional matter and there would
be no need for statutory interpretation."); supra Part L.A (detailing explicit constitutional
enumerations).
13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art II, § 2.
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14
and federal law automatically supersede any inconsistent state law.
Nevertheless, cases arise in which the federal government wishes to
invalidate a state action despite the lack of facially contradictory federal policy. In such cases, the question of preemption becomes
controversial.
A state law can be preempted even if it is not necessarily inconsistent with federal law as long as the federal government has "occupied
the field" by legislating on the subject matter and exhibiting a desire
to exclude the states. 15 Within the broad category of preemption,
there are two specific types: statutory and dormant.' 6 The first refers
to cases in which relevant federal law clearly "occupies the field" of
legislation relating to the subject matter-the statutes sometimes even
including a preemption clause. 17 Under this theory of preemption, if
the federal government has "occupied the field" by legislating on the
subject matter and evoking a desire to exclude the states, then preemption automatically invalidates state laws in the area-even if they
are consistent with the federal measures.' 8 Dormant preemption, on
the other band, is broader in scope and addresses those cases in which
there is no official federal policy on point but where the state legislation may nonetheless infringe upon federal power.' 9 Thus, the concept of dormant preemption comes perilously close to placing an

14
HENKIN, supra note 5, at 156. This same idea applies to executive agreements and
court-made law, as they also enjoy constitutional supremacy. Id. at 157; see also United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("We repeat that there are limitations on the
sovereignty of the States. No State can rewrite all foreign policy to conform to its own
domestic policies. Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the
national government exclusively."); RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § I cmt. 5 ("[Plrinciple
would support the view that the federal government can preempt and exclude the States
not only by statute but by treaty or other international agreement, and even by executive
acts that are within the President's constitutional authority.").
15 HENKIN, supra note 5, at 157-58. Although at the time Henkin wrote ForeignAffairs
and the United States Constitution the Supreme Court had only found preemption in acts of
Congress, Henkin notes that there is no reason that an executive agreement or judicial
doctrine might not also be construed as an occupying force which "closes the field" to state
regulation that is not inconsistent. Id. at 158; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 1 cmt. 5
("Supremacy implies that State law and policy must ban not only when inconsistent with
federal law or policy but even when federal authority has shown a purpose, by 'preempting' or 'occupying the field,' to exclude every State activity that is not inconsistent with
federal law or policy.").
16 See Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11, at 203-08.
17 See id. at 205-08.
18 See supra note 14.
19 Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11, at 203. Implicit in this idea of dormant foreign affairs preemption is the belief that rather than intending to limit plenary
federal power to those foreign affairs concerns specifically enumerated in the Constitution,
the Framers intended the entire field of foreign affairs to be a federal prerogative. See id.
at 203-05.
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implicit constitutional limitation on the state's power to legislate. 20 As
such, dormant preemption draws fire from those "revisionist" commentators who believe foreign affairs preemption should be narrowly
interpreted to preempt state actions only when the federal government has taken express action and enunciated a clear national
21
policy.
C.

Statutory Preemption

Although the concept of statutory preemption is expansive, it remains somewhat less abstract than its dormant counterpart. Professor
Jack Goldsmith, in his article Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, details
several variants of statutory preemption. 2 2 Goldsmith's variants include the theories of express preemption, conflict preemption, obstacle preemption, and field preemption. 23 Despite the considerable
differences among these four categories, each of these concepts remains distinct from dormant preemption because they are rooted in
24
existing federal law.
Express preemption occurs when a federal statute expressly addresses the preemption question on its face, such as through the use
of a preemption clause. 2 - Goldsmith's three other variants are more
ambiguous; they derive their theoretical basis from existing federal
law that does not expressly convey preemptive intent.2 6 For example,
conflict preemption occurs when a state statute "conflicts" with a fed20 Cf HENKIN, supra note 5, at 163-64 (noting that 7schernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
(1968), "imposed additional limitations on the states, but what they are and how far they
reach still remain to be determined").
21

See Michael D. Ramsey, Review Essay: Texibook Revisionism, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1111,

1116-19 (2003) (reviewing CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2002)) (discussing and defining foreign affairs revisionism).
Revisionists tend to reject what they label as foreign affairs "exceptionalism," in which, for

preemption purposes, state statutes touching on foreign affairs are treated with less deference than statutes concerning only domestic issues. Id. at 1116. Revisionists also reject the
idea of dormant foreign affairs preemption, citing a lack of constitutional support for the
idea. See id. at 1118-19. For an in-depth discussion of this debate, see infra Part IIBI.
22
See Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11, at 202-08. Goldsmith has done
the same with different theories of dormant preemption. This Note begins with Gold-

smith's categories and incorporates seminal cases within the case law of foreign affairs
preemption. From this starting point, this Note seeks to determine whether these different
theories of preemption are mutually exclusive, or whether courts have used a combination
of these theories in deciding questions of preemption.
23
Id. at 205-06.
24
See id. at 205-08.
25
Id. at 205.
26 See id. at 205-06 (discussing how these final three types of statutory preemption are
actually forms of "implied" preemption, relying "on evidence of congressional intent to
preempt that [which] is not apparent on the face of the statute"). Some courts and commentators take issue with the more expansive concepts of implied statutory preemption.
The further one gets from an express indication of preemptive intent-and the more tentative the connection between the subject matter of the state statute and its preempting
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27
eral statute, thus making it impossible to comply with federal law.
Obstacle preemption identifies the "purposes and objectives" of a federal statute that is "silent about preemptive scope," with preemption
following only if the state statute "'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment' of these purposes and objectives." 28 Finally, field preemption is significant because it serves as a boundary between the
concepts of statutory and dormant preemption. A state law may be
preempted on field preemption grounds when the federal government has either acted so definitively within a field "so as to le [ave] no
room for the states to supplement it"29 with their regulations, or when
the federal interest in controlling a certain subject is so strong as to
presume that federal law precludes any state action on the same
30
matter.
While the majority of foreign affairs preemption cases are decided on statutory grounds, 3 1 it is often difficult to identify the specific
type of statutory preemption because Goldsmith's four variants tend
to blur. Consider, for example, Crosby v. NationalForeign Trade Council,
2
which exemplifies both obstacle preemption and field preemption.
In Crosby, the act in question was a Massachusetts law passed to discourage local businesses from doing business with Myanmar (formerly
Burma) in order to draw attention to the human rights abuses in that
country. 33 The Supreme Court held that the state law was preempted
because it "undermined the intended purpose and 'natural effect' of
34
at least three provisions" of a recent federal act addressing the issue.
Furthermore, the Court's opinion suggests that even if the Court had
not found that the state law undermined the federal measure, it would
have held that Congress had already occupied the field and therefore
preempted state action on a "field preemption" theory.15

federal counterpart-the smaller the distinction between statutory and dormant preemption. See id. at 206-07.
Id. at 205.
27
Id. at 205-06 (citing Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
28
29
Id. at 206 (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)).
30 Id. at 206 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
31
See, e.g.,
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 370-73 (2000) (holding the Massachusetts Burma Law preempted on statutory grounds); Taiheiyo Cement
Corp. v. Supreme Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 42-46 (Ct. App. 2004) (preempting a state
statute under the theory of conflict (statutory) preemption); Mitsubishi Materials Corp. v.
Supreme Court, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 159, 175-78 (Ct. App. 2003) (same).
32 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
13 See Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in
Burma (Myanmar), 1996 Mass. Acts ch. 130, § 1 (codified at MASs, GEN. LAws ch. 7,
§§ 22G-22M, 40F(a) (1998)).
34 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 (discussing the Massachusetts law as an "obstacle" to the
exercise of federal policy).
35
Id. at 372 ("When Congress intends federal law to 'occupy the field,' state law in
that area is preempted.").
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Dormant Preemption

The concept of dormant preemption refers to judicial authority
to invalidate state actions even when the federal political branches
have taken no express action on the same subject. 36 The Supreme
Court has neither endorsed nor rejected this concept, so the debate
generally comes down to a doctrinal dispute. 37 Those who support
dormant preemption (the "Conventional" camp, who are in the majority3) believe that this form of preemption protects the plenary foreign relations power from state encroachment.39 Opponents of
dormant preemption (the "Revisionists," currently in the minority4°),
however, decry the concept as a means of implementing illegitimate
judge-made law.4 ' Goldsmith identifies several distinct types of dormant preemption, such as dormant foreign affairs preemption, preemption under the federal common law of foreign relations, and
42
dormant foreign commerce clause preemption.
Courts preempting on the basis of dormant foreign affairs preemption tend to justify their decisions by arguing that the Constitution reveals an overriding intent to entrust all matters of foreign
affairs to the federal government. 4 Consequently, whether the federal government has legislated on the issue is irrelevant because the
44
states have no right to pass laws on the subject in the first place.
Similarly, courts create the federal common law of foreign relations by
extending the dormant foreign affairs power beyond preemption and
Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11, at 203.
See infra Part III.
38 James J. Pascoe, Note, Time for a New Approach? Federalism and Foreign Affairs After
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 291, 293 (2002).
39
See HE'oiN, supra note 5, at 162-63; Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, States'
Rights and Foreign Policy: Some Things Should Be Left to Washington, 79 FOREIGN ArF. 9, 9-14
(2000); Lynch, supra note 1, at 221-23 (2000); cf Emily Chiang, Think Locally, Act Globally?
DormantFederalCommon Law Preemptionof State and Local Activities Affecting ForeignAffairs, 53
SYRACUSE L. REv. 923, 935 (2003) (discussing how traditional structural interpretations of
the Constitution for domestic matters "may not hold in the context of foreign affairs").
See Pascoe, supra note 38, at 293.
40
41
See Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11, at 203 ("In operation ... courts
apply this structural constitutional doctrine on the basis of a judicial determination that
the state law or activity has sufficiently bad effects for U.S. foreign relations."). Goldsmith
represents the typical revisionist view of foreign affairs law in general, not just with regard
to dormant preemption. Revisionists oppose the idea of any sort of foreign affairs "exceptionalism," and believe that the same preemption concepts should apply to foreign affairs
as applies to any other type of law. See Ramsey, supra note 21, at 1119, 1122-23.
42 Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11, at 202.
45 See, e.g., Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 49-57 (1st Cir. 1999)
(holding that the Massachusetts Burma Law infringed on powers "vested exclusively in the
federal government"), affd on other grounds sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000).
44 Id
36

37
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using this power to author a federal rule of decision. 45 Finally, dormant foreign commerce clause preemption corresponds to domestic
Commerce Clause analysis, asking whether "a state law facially discriminates against foreign commerce or has substantial discriminating effects," or prevents the federal government from speaking with "one
voice" in foreign commerce. 46 It is often difficult to distinguish between simple dormant foreign affairs preemption and dormant foreign commerce clause preemption, given that the only difference is
whether the state law in question is commercial in nature.
Since the vast majority of preemption decisions are decided on
the basis of statutory preemption, there is a marked lack of available
case law illustrating dormant preemption. 4 7 Ironically, commentators
derive some of the best arguments in favor of dormant preemption
from the dicta in statutory preemption cases. 48 Nevertheless, one Supreme Court decision from the 1960s keeps the idea of dormant for49
eign affairs preemption alive.
Zschernigv. Miller is the quintessential dormant foreign affairs preemption case. At the height of the Cold War, the state of Oregon
passed a law providing for escheat in cases in which a nonresident
alien is set to inherit property. 50 The sole purpose of the statute was
to make it difficult, if not impossible, for residents of Communist-bloc
countries to inherit land from residents of Oregon. 5' In support of
the provision, Oregon claimed that it was within the states' competency to regulate the descent and distribution of estates. 52 Moreover,
Oregon argued that just a few years earlier the Court in Clark v. Allen
45
See Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11, at 204; see also Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416-37 (1964) (fleshing out the federal common law "act
of state doctrine" that prescribes when a litigant in a U.S. court may challenge the validity
of an act of a foreign sovereign government); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land, Customamy InternationalLaw as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 393, 441 (1997) (stating
that Sabbatino stands for the principle that "disputes involving foreign affairs and international law are governed by federal common law in the absence of controlling legislative or
executive branch actions" and this serves to "limit the players involved in the foreign policy
arena"). Goldsmith categorizes the federal common law of foreign affairs as a branch of
dormant preemption. Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11, at 203. This characterization is somewhat puzzling. When a court preempts a statute in the absence of existing federal action on the same subject, and in the absence of an express grant of
constitutional power to do so, it would seem that what Goldsmith describes as plain "foreign affairs preemption" would fall within the category of "federal common law" because
dormant foreign affairs preemption is actually judge-made doctrine, See id.
4'
Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11, at 204-05.
47
See supra note 31.
48
See infra Part IV.B.
4.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
50
Id. at 430-31. Escheat could be avoided if three requirements were satisfied: (1) a
reciprocal U.S. right to take property on the same terms; (2) a right to receive payment
from the foreign estate; (3) a reciprocal foreign right to receive estate proceeds. See id.
51
See id at 437-4].
52

See id. at 440-41.
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upheld a California reciprocity statute which required a 'Just matching of laws" between California and the nation in which the alien set
5
to inherit resided. 1
Nevertheless, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, distinguished Clark and held that the Oregon law was preempted on the
ground that it "has a direct impact upon foreign relations and may
well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with
those problems. ' 54 In particular, the Oregon law troubled the Court
because it allowed state courts to sit in judgment of foreign governments. 5 5 Thus, the phrase "direct impact upon foreign relations"
seemed to set the standard for preemption; in Clark v. Allen the Court
had already ruled that an enactment having only "some incidental or
indirect effect in foreign countries" would not be subject to
56
preemption.
At first glance it appears that the significance of the Zschernig decision is that the Court preempted the statute despite a lack of federal
legislation on the subject. Zschernigs real import, however, lies in its
possible implications for state power. The Court held that "l[t] he several States, of course, have traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates. But those regulations must give way if they impair
the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy."'57 Considering
that, in a globalized society, more traditional "state" areas of regulation often touch on foreign affairs, will they too become targets for
dormant foreign affairs preemption?
Critics of dormant foreign affairs preemption argue that Zschernig
is bad law, or at least should be confined to its facts. 58 Nevertheless,
others contend that the Supreme Court's dicta in cases such as Crosby
v. NationalForeign Trade Council and Hines v. Davidowitz59 support dormant foreign affairs preemption. 60 Although the Supreme Court decided Hines on the ground that a Pennsylvania immigration statute
stood "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
53

Id. at 432-33 & n.5 (discussing Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)).

154
55

See id. at 441.

Cf Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (expressing the
same hesitation to endorse judicial review of the acts of a foreign sovereign). Although
here the act of state doctrine and the concept of dormant preemption seem to converge,
the exploration of potential similarities and differences surrounding the concepts is a task
beyond the scope of this Note. In any event, both can be criticized on the same grounds:
they are judicial innovations with no basis in statutory or constitutional law.
56 Clark, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947).
57 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S, 429, 440 (1968).
58 See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 439-40 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
59 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
6(
See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1262
(2001) (arguing that "Crosby ... offers little cause for celebration to the critics of [the]
dormant foreign affairs doctrine").
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purposes and objectives of Congress," 6' the Court declined to resolve
the question of whether "federal power in this field, whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive. '6 2 Professor Goldsmith points
out-and is technically correct in his assertion-that the Hines Court
did not reserve the foreign affairs domain to the federal government,
which would have invalidated any state action adversely affecting foreign relations.6 3 At the same time, however, the Court did not expressly deny this exclusivity, 64 opting instead to reserve judgment on
65
the question.
Crosby presents a similar conundrum. The Supreme Court decided Crosby on strict statutory preemption grounds. Nevertheless,
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
had first overruled the Massachusetts statute 66 citing Zschernig, claiming that any state measure must give way if it "impair[s] the effective exercise of the Nation'sforeign policy."67 In its subsequent opinion affirming
the Court of Appeals on other grounds, the Supreme Court passed
upon an opportunity to address these assertions. 68 The Court once
again failed to overturn or disavow the Zschernig analysis.
The importance of the Garamendi decision-a preemption case
hovering somewhere between statutory and dormant preemption-is
thus clear. The decision itself is best categorized as an application of
statutory preemption because the Court preempted the California
statute on the grounds that the law obstructed the realization of the
goals of an executive agreement. Nevertheless, the attenuated connection between the agreement and the California law suggests that
the Court may have been invoking dormant preemption under the
guise of its statutory counterpart, or alternatively, the Court may have
been simply leaving the door open for a possible future application of
the dormant theory.

Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
62 Id.at 62; see Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11, at 187-88 (arguing that
Hines articulated the distinction between field and obstacle preemption and did not argue
61

that federal power in foreign relations is exclusive of the states).
63 Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11, at 187-88.
64 Hines, 312 U.S. at 62.
65 Id.

66 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
67 Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 52 (1st Cir. 1999), affd on other
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); see also Nat'l
grounds sub noma.
Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that the
Burmese law impinged on the federal foreign affairs power).
68 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 370-73.
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II
THE GARAMENDI DECISION

A.

Facts

The Garamendi case arose out of several insurance entities' challenge to California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999
(HVIRA) on the grounds that national foreign policy interests and
previous federal agreements preempted the state law.69
1.

The Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act

HVIRA was a core component of California's ongoing initiative to
force insurance companies that issued policies to Holocaust victims
before World War II to pay on those policies. 70 The disputed provisions imposed extensive disclosure requirements on insurance companies operating in California. Specifically, the statute mandated that
any insurer doing business in California disclose details of life, property, liability, health, annuities, dowry, educational, or casualty insurance policies issued to persons in Europe, which were in effect
between 1920 and 1945.71 The sweeping disclosure requirement covered policies sold by any "related company," including "any parent,
subsidiary, reinsurer, successor in interest, managing general agent,
or affiliate company of the insurer, '72 regardless of whether the companies were related at the time the policies were sold.73 HVIRA required that companies disclose information on policies sold to anyone
during that time, 74 including such information as current policy sta69 CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13800-07 (West Cum. Supp. 2004).
70 See id. at 409 (referring to CAL. INs. CODE §§ 790.15(a), 12967(a)(1), (2) (West
Cum. Supp. 2004), which make it an unfair business practice for an insurance company to
fail to pay a Holocaust claim and place an "affirmative duty" on the Department of Insurance to help Holocaust survivors with their claims). The next year, the legislature opened
the California state courts to private litigation on the nonpayment of Holocaust claims and
extended the statute of limitations. CAL. CiV. PRoc. Coor § 354.5 (West Cum. Supp.
2004).
71 CAL. INS. CODE § 13804(a) (West Cum. Supp. 2004). The statute provides:
(a) Any insurer currently doing business in the state that sold life, property, liability, health, annuities, dowry, educational, or casualty insurance
policies, directly or through a related company, to persons in Europe,
which were in effect between 1920 and 1945, whether the sale occurred
before or after the insurer and the related company became related, shall,
within 180 days following enactment of this act, file or cause to be filed the
following information with the commissioner to be entered into the
registry:
(1) The number of those insurance policies.
(2) The holder, beneficiary, and current status of those policies.
(3) The city of origin, domicile, or address for each policyholder listed
in the policies.
Id.
72 Id. § 13802(b).
73 Id. § 13804(a),
74

Id.
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tus, city of origin, domicile, address of policyholder, and names of all
beneficiaries. 75 Furthermore, HVIRA mandated the creation of a central Holocaust Era Insurance Registry open to the public7 6 and imposed mandatory penalties for default, including suspension of the
insurance company's license to do business in California and possible
misdemeanor criminal sanctions for knowingly misrepresenting the
77
specifics of the actual distribution of policies.
2.

The Conflict Between HVIRA and Executive Agreements with
Germany, France, and Austria

Due to the flurry of lawsuits filed against European corporations
in American courts over the past decade relating to allegedly unpaid
insurance policies held by Holocaust victims, the U.S. government established a national claim resolution policy implemented through voluntary international agreement and negotiation, rather than
litigation. 78 The U.S. and German governments hoped to forestall potentially endless litigation and provide the needed closure and restitution through the German Foundation Agreement 79 and the creation
of the German Foundation, which would cooperate with the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC).80
President Clinton and German Chancellor Schroder signed the German Foundation Agreement on July 17, 2000, with former Deputy
Treasury Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat playing a central role in the negotiations. In exchange for a "Statement of Interest"8 1 from the U.S.
government indicating that it is in the foreign policy interests of the
United States to resolve all claims against German companies outside
the court system, the German government agreed to establish a 10
75

Id.
Id. § 13803.
77
See id. § 13804(b).
78
See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 405 (2003) (noting the government's belief that "endless litigation" would not produce a satisfactory outcome, and that
international cooperation would provide greater relief for aging Holocaust survivors);
76

MICHAEL

J.

BAZYLER,

HOLOCAUST JUSTICE:

THE BATrLE

FOR RESTITUTION

IN AMERICA'S

117-32 (2003) (describing the filing of early reclamation suits against European
insurance companies).
79 Agreement Concerning the Foundation, Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future, July 17, 2000, U.S.-F.R.G., 39 I.L.M. 1298 (2000) [hereinafter German Foundation
Agreement].
80 See Garamendi,539 U.S. at 406-08.
81 German Foundation Agreement, supra note 79, at 1303-04. This "statement of interest" includes a statement from the President indicating his belief that dismissal is in the
"enduring and high interest" of the United States, along with a formal foreign policy declaration of the Secretary of State and Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat "in all
pending and future cases." Id. at 1303. Furthermore, although the Agreement binds the
government to submit such a statement, the statement would only favor dismissal on "valid
legal grounds" and the U.S. government would not "suggest that its policy interests ... in
themselves provide an independent legal basis for dismissal." Id. at 1304.
COURTS
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billion deutschemark foundation to serve as the sole forum for the
82
resolution of these claims.
The German Foundation also agreed to work with ICHEIC, an
organization chaired by former Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger charged with negotiating with European insurers and setling unpaid Holocaust-era insurance claims.83 In a supplemental
agreement in October 2002, the German Foundation agreed to supply
additional funding for ICHEIC's operating expenses as well as the settlement of claims under ICHEIC proceedings. 84 The German Foundation also committed to work towards the compilation and
85
publication of a comprehensive list of Holocaust-era policy holders.
Perhaps the greatest legacy of the German Foundation Agreement,
however, is that it served as the model for agreements with Austria and
France. 86 These agreements were substantially similar to the German
Foundation Agreement, although only the Austrian agreement con87
tained a provision providing for the resolution of insurance claims.
While the German Foundation Agreement endeavored to address
the insurance claims of Holocaust victims, the stringent requirements
of California's HVIRA threatened to undermine the long-labored-over
consensual agreement. Following HVIRA's passage and California's
subsequent issuance of subpoenas against several subsidiaries of
ICHEIC participants, Eizenstat wrote to the California Insurance
Commissioner expressing both his and Chairman Eagleburger's
strong opposition to HVIRA. 88 Eizenstat argued that HVIRA
"damag[es] the one effective means now at hand to process quickly
and completely unpaid insurance claims from the Holocaust period"
and "threatens to damage the cooperative spirit which [ICHEIC] requires to resolve the important issue for Holocaust survivors." 9
Speaking for Eagleburger, Eizenstat added that the Chairman opposed "sanctions and other pressures brought by California on companies with whom he is obtaining real cooperation."9 0
Following the California insurance commissioner's indication
that he would enforce HVIRA to its fullest extent, several American
and European insurance companies and trade associations filed suit
82
83
84
85

86
87
88

Garamendi,539 U.S, at 405-08; German Foundation Agreement, supra note 79.
Garamendi,539 U.S. at 406-07.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 408.
See id. at 408 n.3.
Id. at 411 (Eizenstat wrote that while HVIRA "reflects a genuine commitment to

justice for Holocaust victims and their families, it has the unfortunate effect of damaging

the one effective means now at hand to process quickly and completely unpaid insurance
claims from the Holocaust period, the [ICHEIC]." (alteration in original)).
89
Id.
90

Id.
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in the Eastern District of California seeking injunctive relief. The district court appeared to accept the insurance entities' arguments and
issued a preliminary injunction, reasoning that 1-VIRA was most likely
unconstitutional. 9' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a second time following remand and reasoned that HVIRA vio92
lated neither the foreign affairs nor the foreign commerce powers,
"
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B.

The Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the
federal foreign affairs power preempted HVIRA.94 Justice Souter,
writing for the majority in an opinion joined by fourJustices, relied on
a theory of obstacle (conflict) preemption and the inherent weakness
of California's interest in legislating HVIRA.95 The majority employed
a balancing test, weighing the strength of the state interest in legislating in a certain arena against the clarity of the conflict between state
and federal policy.96 In other words, as a state's interest in legislating
in certain areas weakens, the less clear the conflict between the two
policies needs to be, and vice versa.
1.

Foreign Affairs and War Restitution as a Federal Interest

The Court began by recounting the theory behind the federal
foreign affairs power, a large part of which the dissent did not contest.
For example, the majority discussed how state power must yield to the
initiative of the national government to conduct foreign affairs, and
detailed the generalized power of the President to conduct foreign
affairs, the power of the President to effect executive agreements, and
97
the fitness of these executive agreements to preempt state law.
91
The district court's preliminary injunction was predicated on the probability that
HVIRA was unconstitutional under the federal foreign affairs power and the Commerce
Clause. See Gerling Global Reins. Corp. v. Quackenbush, Nos. Civ. S-00-0506WBSJFM, Civ.
S-00-0613WBSJFM, Civ. S-00-0779WBSJFM, Civ. S-00-875WBSJFM, 2000 WL 777978, at *14
(E.D. Cal. June 9, 2000). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of petitioner's due process claim, and the district court subsequently granted suniiary judgment for petitioner. See Gerling Global Reins. Corp. v. Low,
186 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that "mandating license suspension for non-performance of what may be impossible tasks without allowing for a meaningful hearing" violates due process).
92 Gerling Global Reins. Corp. v. Low, 296 F.3d 832, 845-49 (9th Cir. 2002).
93 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 537 U.S. 1100 (2003).
94 Id. at 420-25.
95 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420-29.
96 See id. at 420-25.
97 See id. at 402-08, 413-17; supra Part IL.A.2, I.B. The Court's discussion parallels
this Note's previous background discussion on the theoretical basis for the foreign affairs
power.
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The majority also revisited Zschernig and refused to overturn this
precedent.9 8 The Court reasoned that there is no need to pass upon
the question of whether Zschernig remained good law, as Garamendi
presented a clear case of obstacle preemption. 99 Instead, in dicta, the
Court addressed Zschernig's contemporary relevance by framing the
question of foreign affairs preemption as a dichotomy between obstacle and field preemption. The Garamendifact pattern falls within the
former, while the Court relegated Zschernig to the latter. Field preemption-which apparently would encompass what is normally recognized as dormant foreign affairs preemption-would be implicated
" [i] f a state were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy
with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility" regardless of whether the national government had acted and
without reference to any potential conflict between the two policies. 100 The Court recognized that " [v] indicating victims injured by
acts and omissions of enemy corporations in wartime is within the
traditional subject matter of foreign policy in which national, not
state, interests are overriding," 10 1 but at the same time the Court did
not assert that the national interest is exclusive. Thus, it does not fall
within field preemption and the Court proceeded with its analysis
02
under the theory of obstacle preemption.'
2.

Obstacle Preemption: HVIRA Interferes with the Foreign Policy of
the Executive Branch

As the Court aptly observed, "[t]he basic fact is that California
seeks to use an iron fist where the President has consistently chosen
kid gloves."' 0 3 In other words, the Court acknowledged that the negopresitiations towards the executive agreements illustrate a consistent
10 4
HVIRA.
with
conflict
in
squarely
policy
dential foreign
Since the end of World War II, the United States-through the
President-has encouraged negotiation and settlement in this area.'15
A policy of swift settlement is preferred because it allows companies to
abide by their national privacy laws, which may limit disclosure, and
expeditiously resolves claims in light of the advanced age and dwindling number of remaining Holocaust survivors who would likely not
98

99
100
101
102
103
104

105

See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417-20.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 419 n.ll.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 421-24.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 420.
Id.; see also supra.notes 78-87 and accompanying text (detailing the negotiations

preceding the German Foundation Agreement).
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survive protracted litigation.10 6 To that end, ICHEIC has existing procedures addressing the disclosure of policy information to encourage
settlement. 0 7 In addition to the actual text of the agreements, consistent support for this policy is evinced by statements by Deputy Secretary Eizenstat and other high-level executive branch officials in
congressional hearings. 10
Against this historical landscape, the majority compared the current case to Crosby, a case in which the Court found that a state action
undercut "the President's diplomatic discretion" by threatening to
frustrate the mechanism by which he chose to resolve the conflict. 10 9
In short, the Court recognized that HVIRA makes it more difficult to
persuade companies to participate in ICHEIC, undercuts European
privacy protections, and thus directly conflicts with clear Presidential
policy in this field.
3.

California's Weak State Interest in Legislating

Even assuming that the conflict between the two policies is not
crystal clear, foreign affairs have traditionally been the domain of the
federal government, and California has an exceedingly weak interest
in legislation of this sort.110 Therefore, to the extent any doubt exists,
any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the federal government.
The Court rejected the argument that HVIRA is a California consumer protection statute, 1 ' reasoning that the legislation is unrelated
to any contemporary corporate reliability issues involving insurance
companies operating in California. 112 Instead, the statute is nothing
more than a thinly veiled attempt to ensure payment to Holocaust
survivors-an established interest of the federal government that the
11 3
President has chosen to accomplish by different means.
This analysis introduced a balancing element into the Court's obstacle preemption test. According to the majority, if there is little to
no express conflict, the federal government can still preempt state action in the face of an even weaker state legislative interest. Moreover,
if there is any argument as to the nature of the conflict, because foreign affairs is the domain of the federal government, the Court should
resolve any ambiguity in favor of the federal government.' 14
106

Garamendi,539 U.S. at 422-23.

107
108

Id.
Id. at 422-23.

109
110

Id. at 423-24.
See id. at 425-27.

III
112
113

Id.
Id. 426-27.
Id.
Id. at 425.

114
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C. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg adopted a much more technical
and discrete approach, in contrast to the majority's broader attempt at
balancing. Justice Ginsburg relied primarily on the absence of an executive agreement or formal statement of foreign policy explicitly preempting state disclosure laws like HVIRA, and would require such a
"clear statement" before requiring courts to defer to the "one voice"
policy. 15
1.

Limiting Preemption Doctrine to Explicit Executive Agreements

In this vein, Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority regarding the extent to which certain executive agreements are accorded
preemptive effect.' 1 6 Justice Ginsburg revisited Belmont, Pink, and
Dames & Moore, remarking that until now the Court had reserved the
preemptive status of an executive agreement for cases of express preemption and narrow judicial construction. 1' 7 Her point is that the
German Foundation Agreement (along with its Austrian and French
counterparts) does not specifically address-or even mention-public
disclosure and therefore does not attain preemptive status requiring
HVIRA to yield to another clear national policy."1 8
2.

Disputing the Majority's "Implied Preemption" Analysis

In addition to noting the absence of a provision addressing information disclosure which would conflict with HVIRA, Justice Ginsburg
cautioned against implied preemption and the lingering Zschernig notion of dormant ("field") preemption.1 1 9 Noting that Zschernig has
not been relied on since it was decided, Justice Ginsburg essentially
argued that Zschernig should be limited to its facts and should not be
resurrected. 120 Moreover, in this case HVIRA "t[ook] no position on
any contemporary foreign government and requires no assessment of
any existing foreign regime," thus leaving it outside lschernigs
Id. at 430 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 436-43 (Ginsbrg, J.,dissenting).
117
Id. at 436-38 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting). Justice Ginsburg discussed each in turn,
remarking that United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), concerned claims assigned
under the Litvinov Assignment and a foreign policy that explicitly preempted state policy
in the letter of the agreement; United States v.Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), again concerned
state-imposed obstacles to Litvinov and held that both the assignment itself and a later
exchange of diplomatic correspondence clarifying its scope militated in favor of preemption; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), concerned claims arising out of the Iran
Hostage Crisis and referred claims to a tribunal for arbitration if they were not settled in
six months. Garamendi,539 U.S. at 436-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
t 18 Garamendi;539 U.S. at436-38 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("Indeed, no agreement so
much as mentions the HVIRA's sole concern: public disclosure.").
119 See id. at 439-42 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
I 15
116
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scope. 12 1 Since Pink, Belmont, and Dames & Moore--all of which address "express preemption"-do not support implied preemption by
executive agreement, there is no basis in existing precedent for the
22
majority's decision.1
In addition, the dissent questioned the majority's reliance on
statements "of individual sub-Cabinet members of the Executive
Branch."' 23 The dissent cited Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Board,1 24 which held material such as press releases, letters, and amicus briefs insufficient to justify preemption under the foreign commerce clause.1 2 5 Thus, Justice Ginsburg would require a formal and
binding federal instrument, rather than an executive official's mere
1 26
statement of presidential policy, to permit preemption.
III
THE STATUS OF PREEMPTION LAW AFTER GARAMENDI

The Garamendi decision does not remedy the confusion permeating the law of foreign relations and the concept of foreign affairs preemption. Given the emphasis that the Court placed on the statute's
interference with the President's foreign policy goals, the Court's approach is best characterized as an application of obstacle preemp-

tion. 127 The Garamendi decision does not define the scope of this
theory, however, and places no limits on the interpretive possibilities
of implied preemption or the continued applicability of the dormant
foreign affairs concept implicated in Zschernig. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw several conclusions from the Court's decision.

121

Id. at 439-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg asserted that there still remains a question over whether
the German Foundation Agreement and its progeny even require that Holocaust insurance litigation be removed from American courts. See id. at 432-34 (Ginsburg, J.,dissenting). Given that foreign policy statements the President agreed to file with the court
pursuant to the agreement are not binding, the negotiators may have intended to leave the
agreement ambiguous. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). If the agreements are ambiguous to
that effect, then they are not clear enough to preempt state disclosure laws, which are not
mentioned. Id. at 440-41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, ambiguity ... appears to
have been the studied aim of the American negotiating team.").
123
Id. at 441-42 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
122

124

512 U.S. 298 (1994).

Garamendi,539 U.S. at 442 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have never premised
foreign affairs preemption on statements of that order." (citing Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at
329-30)).
126
Id. (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
127
See supra Part II.B.2.
125
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No Retreat to Statutory Formalism

First, the Court avoided the formalist theory of statutory interpretation thatJustice Ginsburg advocated in her dissent.1 2 8 Justice Ginsburg seemed to be endorsing-at least with regard to executive
agreements-a theory of express preemption.1 2 9 Even the most ardent "revisionists" do not take their argument for the restriction of
preemption to this extreme, instead confining their criticism to the
idea of dormant foreign affairs preemption and the federal common
law of foreign relations. 130 This could be explained by a concern
about the extent of the power implied preemption would grant to the
executive branch. Nevertheless, it is just as probable thatJustice Ginsburg was concerned about the possible extension of the dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrine under the guise of "statutory
interpretation." 1 Thus, considering the absence of an express intent
to preempt state laws and the absence of any reference to disclosure
laws in the executive agreement to provide an express policy conflict,
the effect of the Garamendi Court's preemption theory may, in effect,
132
approach that of its dormant cousin.

128
The vehemence with which Justice Ginsburg attacked the "implied preemption"
analysis is surprising, especially considering the company with whom she joins: Justices
Scalia and Thomas, who have a known penchant for the formalist theory of interpretation.
129
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
130
See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REv.
1617, 1712 (1997) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Federal Courts]; Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption,
supra note 11, at 213 (arguing that the prime motivator for obstacle or field preemption
should be harm to political branch enactments and that field and obstacle preemption are
not "per se illegitimate"). Therefore, because Goldsmith advocates for several of its forms,
he does not appear to oppose implied preemption. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text. Goldsmith might, however, contest the legitimacy of Justice Souter's "presumption of preemption" or "presumption against preemption" invoked in the Court's
balancing test. See Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption,supra note 11, at 177, 182-88 (discussing
the question of whether "preemption analysis [should] indulge a presumption in favor of
the federal government's strong national interest in conducting foreign affairs"). The revisionists contest foreign affairs "exceptionalism," arguing that a federal statute with foreign
affairs implications should not be entitled to any more "deference" under a preemption
analysis than any other federal statute. See Ramsey, supra note 21, at 1116-19. The majority seemed to invoke this presumption in adopting a test where the weaker the state interest (e.g., in "foreign affairs"), the lesser the conflict necessary to preempt under a federal
statute. See supra Part II.B.2-3.
131 The words "statutory interpretation" are placed in quotations to recognize that
Garamendi deals not with the interpretation of a statute, but rather with the interpretation
of an executive agreement. Nevertheless, the issue could arise with regard to either an
executive agreement or statute. For a discussion of how statutory interpretation can be
viewed as disguised preemption law, see Vdzquez, supra note 60, at 1266-1304.
132 The majority opinion makes no effort to limit the scope of interpretation of an
executive agreement to arrive at the conclusion of conflicting policy and "implied
preemption."
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B.

Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption: Neither a
Wholehearted Endorsement Nor the Death Knell Sought
by "Revisionists"

From the perspective of an opponent of dormant foreign affairs
preemption, Justice Ginsburg's concerns regarding the Garamendi
opinion are valid. In footnote 11, the Court declined to address the
question of dormant or, in the majority's words, "field" preemption.' 3 3 Nevertheless, the majority opinion resurrected Zschernig and
provided a tacit, if limited, endorsement.
The Court observed that "[i]t is a fair question whether respect
for the executive foreign relations power requires a categorical choice
between the contrasting theories of field and conflict preemption evident in the Zschernig opinions, but the question requires no answer
here."'1 34 In footnote 11, which may imply support for Zschernig and
dormant preemption, the majority offered an example in which foreign affairs preemption might be proper even in the absence of conflicting federal policy. 135 Such a case would arise "if a State were
simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious
13 6
This proclaim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility."
is
premised
which
Zschernig,
from
follow
not
does
position, however,
on
effects
incidental
than
more
on the idea that any state action with
federal
the
not
or
foreign affairs is preempted regardless of whether
government has acted. 137 Garamendi,on the other hand, seems to indicate that, in the absence of conflicting federal action, dormant foreign affairs preemption is possible if the state's action affects foreign
3
affairs without addressing a "traditional state responsibility."' ' Consequently, it is conceivable that, under the majority's analysis, a state
regulation that affects foreign affairs but also regulates a "traditional
state responsibility" could survive a Garamendi analysis.
While the Court refused to kill off Zschernig, it did not completely
clarify it. The majority's efforts to address dormant preemption are
too vague to be successful, and its field preemption theory and obstacle preemption balancing analysis ignore the problem of discerning
See Garamendi, 439 U.S. at 419 n.l; supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
Garamend4 539 U.S. at 419-20 (footnote omitted). The majority arguably missed a
chance to harmonize the two doctrines by devising a balancing test in which both apply.
135
d. at 419 n.11.
136 Id.
137 See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text; Garamendi,539 U.S. at 417-19.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.l. One can argue that the majority's interpretation
1of the Zschernig doctrine is what the Court actually had in mind when it decided the case.
Emily Chiang points out that "although Zschernig is frequently reduced to the 'indirect and
incidental effects' test, the Court also noted that the statute at issue attempted to engage in
a forbidden state activity, and that it would impair the effective exercise of the nation's
foreign policy." Chiang, supra note 39, at 966.
133
134
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state and federal areas of supremacy.1 39 As such, the decision does
not come close to setting a clear standard articulating when a state
1 40
action sufficiently affects foreign affairs to necessitate preemption.
C.

The "Right Decision" From a "Results-Based" Standpoint

As a matter of policy, it seems evident that the Court arrived at
the "right" decision in this case and realized the intent of the drafters
of the German Foundation Agreement.14 1 The statements of former
Deputy Secretary Eizenstat and Chairman Eagleburger indicate that
HVIRA is the kind of state statute the drafters hoped to avoid in order
to maintain a cooperative spirit in settling Holocaust survivor insurance claims and forestalling litigation. 142 Although the German Foundation Agreement and its Austrian and French counterparts do not
prohibit, or even address, HVIRA's disclosure laws, the accompanying
sanctions under state law for failure to comply would arguably undermine the U.S. government's policy of encouraging out-of-court settlements and resolution through participation in ICHEIC.' 45 It would
logically follow that the state policy would have a negative effect on
the executive's conduct of foreign affairs and stated policy. Nevertheless, this results-based reasoning is neither a sufficient justification for
the Court's decision nor sound jurisprudence. The Court should not,
from a doctrinal standpoint, adopt an expansive concept of foreign
affairs preemption in one case and a formalist interpretation in another-even if the respective outcomes are desirable from a policy
standpoint.
The Court's current obstacle preemption analysis requires courts
to apply an extensive, fact-laden balancing test. Rather than solely
looking to the text of the executive agreement, a court must also determine the intended scope of the underlying policy. Similarly, the
Court's dormant preemption doctrine also necessitates a judicial determination of national foreign policy, sometimes without the assistance of any articulated federal position. Thus, the Garamendiopinion
begs the overall question: is an expansive preemption doctrine a
144
sound proposition?
139
140

See Chiang, supra note 39, at 990.
Id. at 985-90.

141

See German Foundation Agreement, supra note 79.

142

See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.

See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 403-08.
Most of the critiques and arguments for an "expansive" preemption doctrine mirror those made for and against dormant foreign affairs preemption. The term "expansive"
was chosen to include an analysis of both dormant foreign affairs preemption and the type
of obstacle preemption adopted in the Garamendicase and opposed by Justice Ginsburg.
143
144
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IV
LAYING THE FRAMEWORK FOR SOUND DEVELOPMENT
IN THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

Although the current, vague standard of preemption embraced
by the Supreme Court in Garamendiis not without problems, the alternative-the notion that foreign affairs preemption should be confined to cases of express conflict-is even less desirable. Implied and
even dormant preemption are better options, which can be narrowly
tailored to work without sacrificing the flexibility needed to respond
to state interference with federal responsibilities.
Objections to an Expansive Preemption Theory

A.

Although the majority of the critiques discussed were developed
to address the concept of dormant foreign affairs preemption, they
also apply to the type of "implied" preemption present in
45
Garamendi.1
1.

"Textualist" or "Originalist"Critique

Nearly all critiques of expanded foreign affairs preemption mention the lack of "textual" or "original" constitutional support for the
doctrine. 146 No matter how convenient an expanded doctrine of preemption may be, these critics argue, such a practice is unconstitutional because it empowers the judiciary to preempt in the absence of
sufficient textual guidance from the political branches. 147 Although
originalist constitutional arguments tend to devolve into inconclusive
48
doctrinal disputes, the arguments warrant at least brief mention.
Critics of the dormant preemption doctrine assert that the constitutional argument for a "self-executing exclusion of state authority"
from foreign affairs is without merit. 149 Although the Constitution assigns certain enumerated foreign relations powers to the federal gov145
See Goldsmith, Statutoy Preemption, supra note 11, at 212-13 (arguing that "courts
can, under the rubric of obstacle or field preemption, insert independent judicial conceptions of U.S. foreign relations interests"); see also Vdzquez, supra note 60, at 1266 (remarking that "there is no bright line between federal common law and 'mere' statutory

interpretation").
146 See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 130, at 1642; Pascoe, supra note 38, at
307-08; Vizquez, supra note 60, at 1305-08.
147 See V:!zquez, supra note 60, at 1275 (referring to Crosby and remarking that "[i]n
both cases [dormant and obstacle preemption] state law is being displaced in the face of

congressional silence").
148

See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Af

fairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 238-43 (2001) (tracing the various disputes over the sources of
foreign affairs power and their rightful allocation among the various branches of government and remarking that the text of the Constitution is ultimately inconclusive on this
issue).

149

Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 130, at 1641-42.
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ernment and keeps several from the states, 50 there is no evidence to
support an intended, judicially enforceable exclusion. 15t Goldsmith
argues that although the Framers intended to strengthen the foreign
relations powers of the federal government after the disastrous Articles of Confederation, they did so by empowering the federal government to act through these enumerated powers, and to ensure state
compliance with their enactments by virtue of the Supremacy Clause
or a clear indication of preemptive intent. 5 2 It follows, according to
this theory, that any sort of preemption without an affirmative federal
enactment-and even obstacle preemption where the determination
of preemptive intent is not grounded in the text or background of an
enactment-is without constitutional basis.
2.

Structural and Policy Arguments

Structural and policy critiques focus on the desirability of a strict
federal foreign affairs preemption regime, paying special attention to
the nature of the international system which has changed significantly
over the past fifteen years. The nature of the global economy has
changed, and so has the relationship between state, local, and federal
1 53
governments.
Structural critics argue that a uniform foreign policy established
by the federal government is no longer of great importance and that
state intervention in foreign affairs is tolerable due to the end of the
Cold War and globalization.15 4 State and local governments now have
more direct contact with foreign states, and in some cases foreign
states prefer to deal with them. 55 Furthermore, some scholars suggest that state missteps are no longer catastrophic because, with the
demise of the Soviet bloc, the "imperative of national defense"'5 6 has
dissipated and "survival is no longer so clearly at stake in foreign relations decision making. 1 57 Along the same lines, some commentators
150

Supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.

151

Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supranote 130, at 1641-43.

152

It is of some note that the courts did not recognize any state exclusion during the

country's first 175 years. Id. at 1645.
153
Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223, 1247-48
(1999).
154 Vizquez, supranote 60, at 1308; see also Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 130, at
1676-77 ("In short, foreign relations is no longer a district issue area: it is something and
that something has come to embrace an increasingly large number of issues once assumed
to be the presence of domestic politics." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
155
See generally PeterJ. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO

ST. L.J. 649, 719-20 (2002) (providing an extensive discussion of how globalization has
transformed foreign affairs federalism, bringing the component parts of the United
States-such as the individual states themselves-to the forefront and allowing other actors
on the international stage to maintain a direct relationship).
156 Spiro, supra note 153, at 1275.
157

Id. at 1223-24.
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argue that the resulting global environment is such that there is no
longer a need to guard against national retaliation for the actions of
individual states. 158 Instead, it is more likely that foreign states offended by the acts of individual American states will direct their retali59
ation against those states rather than the nation as a whole.'
The policy critiques are less forceful than the legal arguments
against preemption. The most common objection is that an expansive
concept of foreign affairs preemption foils state attempts to improve
human rights conditions abroad. 160 Given that local economies have
direct contact with foreign states, many argue that state and local gov161
ernments should take the lead in protesting human rights abuses.
Moreover, some also assert that state participation at the foreign affairs level permits the injection of "more democracy" into foreign affairs decisionmaking, since the force behind many of these state
humanitarian statutes are concerned citizens or special interest
groups. 162
These same individuals would cite the Crosby Court's invalidation
of the Massachusetts Burma Law as a prime example of a noble state
163
Justice Ginsaction invalidated by an overactive federal judiciary.
burg's dissent in Garamendi provides another possible illustration.
While she framed her argument in terms of a lack of express preemption or any clear intent to preempt, it appears that her desire for
greater formalism partially stems from a popular concern for the fate
of Holocaust victims residing in California and the potential benefit of
the information clearinghouse HVIRA's forced disclosure provisions
64
establish.'

Id. at 1261-64.
Id. (detailing Mexico's sanctions against California in retaliation for its immigration policy, Japan's possible sanctions against Massachusetts for its anti-Burma law, as well
as the European and Canadian action against Texas for the way in which it administers the
death penalty).
Vjzquez, supra note 60, at 1315.
160
161
Denning & McCall, supra note 39, at 11 (also noting that "states compete for foreign business, many states with large urban cities host foreign consulates, and some contain large numbers of resident aliens or recent immigrants who retain close ties to their
homelands").
162
Pascoe, supra note 38, at 315; see also Denning & McCall, supra note 39, at 11 (discussing the role of nongovernmental organizations in replacing elite foreign policymaking
with a decentralized grassroots movement).
See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
163
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 430-33 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissent164
ing) (first enumerating the unquestionable evils perpetrated by European insurance companies during the 1930s and 1940s, then discussing the difficulties of obtaining results
through the U.S, court system and ICHEIC, and explaining the potential benefits of a
public claim database established under the HVIRA).
158
159
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Functional Critiques

Functional critiques of expanded foreign affairs preemption, perhaps the most valid, claim that the doctrine relies too much on judicial discretion in a domain for which judges are not trained. The
practice requires judges to look beyond the law and make policy determinations, ranging from determinations of what the policy actually
is to evaluating potential differences in policies. 165 This critique is the
most pointed with regard to critiques of dormant foreign affairs preemption and federal common law, yet it is equally applicable to some
forms of obstacle preemption, arguably including that applied in
Garamendi.
Goldsmith is perhaps the most vocal champion of 'Judicial
minimalism" with regard to foreign affairs issues.' 66 Rather than possessing the informed decisionmaking capabilities of the political
branches, Goldsmith argues that the judiciary lacks institutional competence and makes "unguided intuitive judgment[s]" in the foreign
affairs arena. 167 Even if a judge attempts to inform herself, the complexity of such issues-and the judge's lack of training-will likely
lead to error.16
There are several instances in which judicial incompetence may
manifest itself. First, judges may have difficulty distinguishing foreign
affairs from domestic in a globalized world: "The waning of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs means that just about
any state law, when applied in a case involving a foreign element, is
potentially subject to judicial preemption." 16 9 Not only does this pose
important federalism issues, but once judges determine that legislation implicates foreign affairs, they must apply a multifactor analysis,
taking into account the U.S. foreign policy on the subject, the state
legislation's potentially adverse effects on that policy, the state legislaGoldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 130, at 1668-69.
Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11, at 208 (clarifying that by "minimalism," Goldsmith means that "courts should eliminate... any independent judicial consideration of the foreign relations consequences of preemption" and "courts should make the
decision to preempt on the narrowest possible ground, which ... is rarely broader than
obstacle preemption of a particular sort").
167
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 130, at 1690-91
Once this intuitive judgment has been satisfied, [courts] conclude, without
further analysis, that the issue must be governed by uniform federal law.
And the context of this law, like the basis forjudicial federalization, is rarely
(if ever) informed by an analysis of the actual foreign relations policies of
the political branches.
165
166

168

Id. at 1692-93.

169 Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11, at 210; see also Goldsmith, Federal
Courts, supra note 130, at 1671 (describing the changing nature of foreign affairs and the
integration of nion-traditional considerations such as trade, investment, technology and
energy transfers, environmental and social issues).
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tion's potential adverse effect on foreign policy in general, as well as
the state's own interest in legislating in the first place. By adding
more factors into the equation, globalization and the advent of decentralized economies make it more difficult to balance the benefits of
increased state control against the benefits of a centralized foreign
1 70
policy.
In light of the infirmities of judicial decisionmaking in the foreign affairs arena, it thereby follows that any decisions made by the
judiciary are removed from the competency of the more qualified political bodies. t 71 Even though judicial preemption does not preclude
political action to correct erroneous judicial interpretations, a more
active role for the courts may exacerbate the inaction of the executive
and legislative branches, making them even less likely to exercise their
responsibilities and powers relating to foreign affairs. 172 Therefore,
using foreign affairs preemption to remedy political branch inertia
1 73
may result in a cure worse than the disease.
B.

Justifying Expansive Preemption: Limited Judicial Discretion
as the Lesser of Many Evils
1.

A Sound ConstitutionalBasis

Although many of these concerns support valid criticism, the benefits of a uniform foreign policy outweigh the problems of an expanded preemption doctrine. Proponents of a strong preemption
power cite the existence of a well-grounded, constitutional federal foreign affairs power. The foreign affairs powers the Constitution grants
to the federal government, the Article I restrictions imposed upon the
states, and the commentary of several Framers suggest that the Framers intended the federal government to have strong control over foreign affairs. 174 Madison's urgings in Federalist42 that "[i]f we are to be
170
See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 130, at 1670-80 (discussing the increased
complexity of foreign affairs in a global society due to the recent development of substantial subnational foreign relations activity).
171
For a discussion of how this functionalist argument merges into the structural and
policy arguments with separation-of-powers implications, see Curtis A. Bradley, World War 11
Compensation and Foreign Relations Federalism, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 282, 283-88, which
argues that with regard to foreign affairs, judicial decisionmaking bypasses procedural safeguards of the legislative process, producing a lack of political accountability and democratic legitimacy. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 130, at 1667-68.
172
See Goldsmith, Statutoiy Preemption, supra note 11,at 210-11.
173 See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
174 This decision to centralize the foreign affairs power in a strong national government is likely attributable to the Framers' experience under the ineffective Articles of Confederation. See Denning & McCall, supra note 39, at 13-14 (noting that Justice Story wrote
that Americans were victims of their own "imbecility" under the Articles of Confederation
by consistent state interference in foreign policy); Vzquez, supra note 60, at 1306-07 (discussing Zschernig supporters' claims that the Framers intended to "design a government
that would not be subject to the problems that states had created for the Confederation
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one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other
nations"'175 and Hamilton's remark in Federalist 80 that "the peace of
the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART '176 indicate
that the Framers intended the federal government to be the sole organ of foreign policy. Any claim to the contrary "epitomizes interpretive literalism at its most wooden and ignores the historical context in
177
which constitutional powers were assigned."
Even assuming arguendo that the constitutional basis for dormant
or obstacle/field preemption is weak, stare decisis considerations support obstacle/field preemption because continuity of a long-recog178
nized doctrine promotes stability and predictability in the law.
Vdzquez illustrates the confusion that would result should the courts
reject expansive preemption and require more express forms of preemption, intimating that in Crosby Congress may have omitted an explicit reference to preemption (such as a preemption clause) in
reliance on a preemption theory, which the Court upheld. 179 As such,
if the Supreme Court had required such an express indication, it
would have thwarted congressional intent.8 0
Given the strength of the constitutional background and stare decisis considerations, a strong foreign affairs preemption doctrine remains a legitimate exercise of the federal courts' duty to police the
boundaries between state and federal power.
2.

Good Structure, Good Policy

As the previous section demonstrated, substantial constitutional
support for foreign affairs preemption doctrine exists. In addition to
this strong historical context, the preemption power remains particularly wise as a policy matter following the attacks of September 11,
2001 and the war in Iraq. The end of the Cold War notwithstanding,
the United States arguably faces far more numerous-and much less
predictable-dangers. In the interest of maintaining a strong, yet
flexible, foreign policy it becomes necessary to exclude the states from
through their parochial foreign affairs activities" under the problems of the Articles of
Confederation).
175 THEiFEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Arlington House 1966).
176

THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Arlington House 1966).

Denning & McCall, supra note 39, at 12; see also Chiang, supra note 39, at 935 (remarking that "the usual structural assumptions for internal affairs may not hold in the
context of foreign affairs").
178
Vdzquez, supra note 60, at 1307 (qualifying this argument with the assertion that
dormant foreign affairs preemption is a subconstitutional issue, and therefore stare decisis
should play a stronger role).
179
Id. at 1308.
180
Id.
177
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an area in which they have no legitimate role.' 8 ' Since the nation's
founding, the United States has had a strong interest in other nations
perceiving U.S. foreign policy as uniform. 1 82 For example, should foreign governments perceive that state policy could undermine the national position, the resulting uncertainty would jeopardize the
credibility of the federal negotiations and policies at an international
level.' s3 Indeed, if U.S. negotiators in the Garamendi context had
been unable to convince the German government and insurance companies that there was a strong possibility that their statement of interest in dismissal would be given effect in the national courts, the
184
German Foundation Agreement may never have been signed.
Keeping states out of the realm of foreign relations protects U.S.
foreign policy interests for another reason. State and local activities
can also impute hostility towards foreign nations' citizens or economic
interests, and therefore interfere with U.S. foreign relations. 185 Although foreign states may choose "targeted retaliation" as a more effective means of dealing with the problem, it is not clear that there is
any national benefit to having foreign states deal directly with the individual U.S. states.'8 6 This phenomenon, which the Founding Fathers hoped to avoid, and which one scholar suggests will cause
national disintegration, can in no way be good for the United
States.' 8 7 Furthermore, retaliation tends not to be targeted. 8 8 For
example, the World Trade Organization lodged a complaint against
the United States regarding the Massachusetts Burma law. Additionally, a retaliatory boycott by a "major Swiss retailer" affected states who
had not initiated local sanctions for that country's failure to release
Holocaust-era bank accounts. 8 9 Moreover, in cases like Garamendi,
the logic of the targeted retaliation argument would not apply. The
most likely form of retaliation would be the insurance companies' refusal to cooperate with ICHEIC, which damages U.S. foreign policy
and jeopardizes the claims of an ever-dwindling number of Holocaust
survivors-including those in states other than California.
181 See Chiang, supra note 39, at 957 (stating that pro-preemption scholars argue that
states becoming involvcd in foreign affairs can create "disorder and uncertainty" and an
unfavorable response); see also H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 527, 548 (1999) ("[T]he actual

conduct of foreign affairs . .. reflects a complex interplay between international events,
policy goals, political concerns, and legal arguments rather than the straightforward execution of anyone's constitutional vision.").
182
See Pascoe, supra note 38, at 314.
183 Id.
184

185
186
187
188
189

See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
See Pascoe, supra note 38, at 314.

Cf Vfzquez, supra note 60, at 1311-12.
Id.

See id. at 1311.
Denning & McCall, supra note 39, at 13.
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The policy arguments alleging that foreign affairs preemption
prevents beneficial state action that could improve human rights
abroad are also without merit, 90 even if such sanctions were more
effective than their federal counterparts. The wisdom of allowing
such sanctions to stand is a political question that the political
branches-not the courts-must answer. 19' Moreover, the political
branches have the power to allow similar state sanctions to stand, protecting them from preemption by clearly indicating that intent.
C.

Functional Justifications and Workable Problems

Structural and policy concerns mandate that a strong federal preemption power exist, and functional concerns dictate that the federal
192
The
judiciary must play some role in implementing this policy.
most efficient way to ensure that states respect the national prerogative in foreign affairs is for the courts to vigilantly police the boundaries between federal and state powers.19 3 Simply because the political
branches can act to affirmatively exclude the states with a clear preemption clause does not mean that such action is the only-or bestmeans of accomplishing the goal.
Requiring such an affirmative statement of intent to preempt is
not the best way to achieve these goals. The legislative process is onerous; the Constitution made it that way in order to protect state prerogatives with regard to federal legislation. In the high-stakes world of
foreign affairs, Congress or the President often cannot effectively re194
spond to offensive state activity before adverse consequences occur.
Moreover, Congress still provides a preventative cushion in cases of
legislajudicial overstep with the ability to enact subsequent remedial
19 5
tion governing whether a type of statute is preempted.
The more valid functional critiques come into play concerning
the relative institutional competencies of the federal courts and the
political branches. 9 6 Specifically, many commentators doubt that the
See Vizquez, supra note 60, at 1315-16.
See id. at 1316; see also Chiang, supra note 39, at 940 ("A principled evaluation of
these laws ... requires that we distinguish between support for the substantive goals of a
state or local statute and the question of the validity of the statute itself given our federal
system.").
190
191

192

Id.

Denning & McCall, supra note 39, at 13 (noting that "policing the demarcation
between federal and subfederal governments . . . is the appropriate province of the
judiciary").
Vdkzquez, supra note 60, at 1310.
194
195 Chiang, supra note 39, at 962; Vdzquez, supranote 60, at 1323 (suggesting "that the
states are perfectly capable of making their preferences felt and achieving the reversal in
the political process of anyjudicial decision holding a class of state laws preempted as likely
to unduly interfere with foreign relations").
196 See Chiang, supra note 39, at 957.
193
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federal courts are competent to make decisions relating to foreign affairs.' 97 These critiques, although valid, are often overemphasized.
They ignore that the concept of foreign affairs preemption "does not
license the courts to make foreign policy;"' 98 rather, it requires them
to ensure that only the national political branches conduct foreign
policy.'9 9 Nevertheless, one can argue that in the course of performing these duties, courts must exercise some foreign policyjudgment,
determining whether a state action affects foreign relations and the
200
extent to which it does.
Such criticism should not be ignored. It can, however, be addressed by a reformulation of existing doctrine-specifically dormant
foreign affairs preemption-in a more categorical vein. 20 1 The obstacle preemption in Garamendi demonstrates a step in the right direction, although the opinion fails to articulate this progress.
Traditionally, the idea of obstacle preemption has not been as
controversial as its dormant cousin, despite the "implied" nature of
the preemptive intent. 20 2 Most have attributed this tolerance to the
fact that preemption of state or local action remains grounded in an
existing federal enactment on the same subject. 20 3 Institutional competence objections are largely without merit because courts can look
to legislative history, diplomatic communiques, drafts of executive
agreements, and statements submitted to the court by the parties involved in forging the federal act. These processes amount to nothing
more than hearing evidence, which courts are uniquely qualified to
do. For example, the Garamendi Court-which considered evidence
such as legislative hearings, accounts of negotiations of the settlement
agreements, executive agreements, and amicus curiae briefs-demonstrates how a court may use many available tools in reaching a decision as to whether the two policies conflict, thus rendering the
2 4
institutional competency argument irrelevant. 11
The functional issues surrounding the concept of dormant preemption are more troubling. Courts may be poorly situated to make
determinations of foreign policy where no previous embodiment of
197

See supra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.

Vazquez, supra note 60, at 1318 (emphasis added).
199
Id.
200 Id.
201
See id. at 1316.
202
See Goldsmith, Statutory Preemption, supra note 11 (stating that foreign affairs preemption of state law is more legitimate the greater the extent of political branch guidance
and the lesser the extent of independentjudicial foreign policy analysis, thus placing obstacle preemption higher on the legitimacy scale than dormant preemption).
20-.
Id. at 207.
204
See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420-27 (2003); cf supra notes
114-18 and accompanying text.
198
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20
federal policy exists in the form of a statute or executive agreement.
This problem, however, does not require a wholesale abandonment of
the doctrine. Courts can remedy problems of dormant preemption
through categorization 20 6 and restriction of the scope of Zschernig.
This omission is Garamendi's great failure-with the decision leaving
the future of Zschernig undecided but in doubt, given the Court's
vague "balancing test" involving state and national interests.207 Such
an exercise of discretion may be appropriate in the context of the
Court's obstacle preemption balancing test in which the national interest is evident and the state's interest in legislating can be weighed
against a clearly conflicting national policy. Where, however, the balancing test is reduced to comparing state interest to vague notions of
national policy, or where ajudge must determine areas in which states
have "no interest," such judicial discretion becomes an unpredictable
20°
and unattractive alternative.
Several commentators have proposed the creation of formal categories to make Zschernig more applicable, predictable, and consistent
by creating rules invalidating a "particular category of state law that the
Court concludes is especially likely to cause foreign relations
problems." 20 9 If the political branches feel such a category is over- or
under-inclusive, Congress can always correct the problem with legislation revising the category or eliminating it. For example, some commentators propose a bright-line rule preempting state laws which are,
on their face, directed at a foreign nation or groups of foreign nations. 21 0 Others support bright-line rules which preempt state action
not directed at foreign states on its face, but nonetheless have undesir-

205

See Vazquez, supra note 60, at 1318.

See id. at 1318-19. Vazquez actually refers to increased "formalism" in dormant
foreign affairs preemption, and recommends categorization as a move towards formalism.
The analysis tries to avoid overuse of the word "formalism" in this analysis, so the reader
will not confuse increased categorization and predictability with the type of formalism advocated by Justice Ginsburg, who propounds a wholesale abandonment of the dormant
preemption doctrine in favor of express preemption by statute or executive agreement. See
supra Part II.B, IIM.A.
207 See supra Part fI.B, 11I.A.
208 Vazquez, supra note 60, at 1318 (observing that "given the open-ended nature of
the inquiry, vesting the judiciary with such authority undermines the rule of law values of
certainty, predictability and consistent treatment of like cases").
209
Id. at 1319; see also Chiang, supra note 39, at 980 (proposing the creation of brightline rules). For an example of a court attempting to categorize areas of foreign affairs as
"forbidden" to states, see Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003). The Deutsch
court conceded the imprecise scope of the federal "foreign relations power," but stated
that there exists an "inner core of this power" upon which the states may not encroach. Id.
at 711-12. This "inner core" encompasses any power related to war, and the court reconciles Zschernigby placing it within this category as an example of state infringement "as a
potential provocation to foreign powers" at the height of the Cold War. Id at 711.
Chiang, supra note 39, at 980.
210
206
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able effects on foreign relations. 2 1" Court decisions could establish a
litany of impermissible and undesirable effects of state laws, such as
angering other nations and directly interfering with the conduct of
foreign policy.21 2 The guiding hand of precedent could render the
law of foreign relations more predictable, removing from the judicial
prerogative the task of ad hoc policy analysis and replacing it with
decisions based on straightforward application of precedent to certain
2
categories of state laws.

D.

13

The Zschernig Panic: An Exaggeration

Although some formalist progress in the field of dormant preemption would be wise, Garamendiultimately fails to follow through.
Thus, the paranoia of those fearing a federal usurpation of any state
power possibly touching on foreign affairs continues. More likely
than not, this fear is needless. Even if at some future date courts endorse the broad interpretation of Zschernig and the "indirect and incidental effects test," any impact would probably be minimal. Any state
act with effects on foreign affairs so great that they provoke a lawsuit
could also probably be invalidated on grounds of statutory preemption. 214 Chance alone dictates that in an area of such importance,
either the legislature or the executive will have spoken on the matter
by statute or executive agreement. Illustrating this supposition is the
striking fact that not a single pure dormant foreign affairs preemption
case has arisen since Zschernig.215 Furthermore, even in dicta, courts
have only rarely interpreted Zschernigso as to prohibit any state legislation which happened to touch on foreign affairs-an admitted impossibility in this day and age.2 1 6 Like Justice Souter and the Garamendi
majority, most courts have tiptoed around the issue, so as not to offend traditional state prerogatives such as choice of law and enforcement of foreign judgments, which may have a large impact on the
2 17
international community.
211

Id. at 989.

Id. (noting that such effects of a given state act should be relatively easy to ascertain
by looking at communications from foreign states, thereby encouraging input from the
political branches).
213
Vazquez, supra note 60, at 1319.
214 Id. at 1259; see also Taiheiyo Cement Corp. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32,
41-42 (Ct. App. 2004) (preempting a state statute on a conflict theory due to conflict with
a treaty); Mitsubishi Materials Corp. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 159, 175 (Ct. App.
2003) (avoiding the controversy surrounding either dormant or field preemption by
choosing instead to preempt on the terms of a relevant treaty).
215
See Chiang, supra note 39, at 965 (noting that the Supreme Court has taken few
post-Zschernig cases remotely implicating the question of foreign affairs preemption in
general).
216
Vdizquez, supra note 60, at 1317.
217
Id,
212
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CONCLUSION

An expansive foreign affairs preemption power in the hands of
the federal courts is desirable from both a constitutional and policy
perspective. Although the Supreme Court's recent Garamendi decision does little to remedy or address the functional problems plaguing
dormant preemption analysis, the Court's failure to move towards a
purely formalist application of preemption doctrine is not a negative
development. Rather, the obstacle preemption applied in the
Garamendi case addressed all the relevant state and federal interests,
allowing the court to analyze with accuracy the conflicts between a
state statute and an established federal policy. Furthermore, the hesitance and restraint with which courts have traditionally touched the
issue of dormant preemption indicates that concern regarding any impending usurpation of state legislative prerogatives is unfounded.
Nevertheless, the doctrine should be reformulated and solidified in
order to increase predictability and certainty, giving both the federal
courts and state legislatures more confidence in actions taken in areas
that could possibly affect foreign affairs.

